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In this Article we examine the special, often unique, ethical problems
faced by lawyers who practice in the regulatory sector. We argue that such
problems exist both for lawyers who represent clients before administrative
agencies and for the lawyers who actually work within such agencies
themselves.
As a general matter, the relationship between lawyers and their clients is
like any other agency relationship.' Thus, any problem between lawyers and
clients in the private sector is simply a particular manifestation of the general
agency problem that exists between shareholders and corporate managers, or
doctors and patients. Many of the rules of professional responsibility are di-
rected at reducing this agency-cost problem by providing a set of default rules
that fill in the gaps in the contractual relationship that exists between lawyers
and their clients, thereby reducing agency costs.2 Rules governing client con-
fidentiality, lawyer competence, conflicts of interest, and the use of a client's
funds are examples of gap-filling rules that further the interests of the legal
profession by reducing the agency costs associated with the relationship be-
tween a lawyer and her client.
It is important to realize that, at least in the private sector, these rules
are not the only source of constraint upon the behavior of lawyers. Rather,
the rules of ethics and professional responsibility supplement a variety of
market mechanisms that exist in the private sector and work to control the
behavior of lawyers.
This combination of constraints upon lawyer behavior is effective at con-
trolling many of the ethical problems that arise within the private sector. We
argue, however, that a variety of factors prevent this combination of con-
straints from working effectively within the regulatory sector.
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1977, Harvard; J.D. 1982,
Yale.
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1 See infra part I.
2 As with contractual relationships generally, the contractual relationship between the
attorney and the client may be express or implied. CI nIEs W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
Ermcs 501 (Prac. ed. 1986). There is no requirement in the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility or Model Rules of Professional Conduct that a fee contract be in writing, although
Model Rule 1.5(b) "states that the basis or rate of the fee should 'preferably' be communicated
to the client in writing." Id. at 502 (quoting MODEL RuLE.s OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule
1.5(b) (1983)). Professor Wolfram continues by stating that "[m]ost lawyers prefer to have a
written agreement signed very near the beginning of the representation as a matter of sound
client relationships." Id. at 503.
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With respect to lawyers who represent clients before government agen-
cies, the importance to clients of hiring lawyers with expertise and a proven
track record in representing clients before particular regulatory agencies cre-
ates a situation in which lawyers representing clients before agencies easily
are "captured" by the agencies before whom they practice.3 In particular,
because private-sector lawyers often are "repeat-players" in their actions
before government regulators, they have strong incentives not to alienate the
bureaucrats. We will show that this repeat-player representation by law firms
can lead to less than zealous representation because lawyers balance the im-
mediate interests of their present client against the long-term interests of
their firms in maintaining a cordial relationship with a particular bureaucrat
or bureaucracy.
Private-sector lawyers who represent clients before government agencies
also face special ethical problems where those agencies have the power to
bring sanctions against private-sector lawyers for ethical violations.4 As re-
cent developments in banking and securities law demonstrate, public agen-
cies are obtaining expanded powers that allow them to impose massive
sanctions on firms for "ethical" violations.5 Thus, even those firms that are
not concerned with long-term relationships with a particular agency are likely
to be less than zealous representatives of their clients due to fear of
sanctions.
The special ethical problems that exist for lawyers who work within the
government exist for three reasons. First, the market forces that characterize
the relationship between lawyers and clients in the private sector are conspic-
uously absent in the public sector. The lack of market constraints, coupled
with concerns about agenda control and career building by government law-
yers, makes the problem of ethical conduct by government attorneys far
more difficult to solve.
A second reason why lawyers in administrative agencies face special eth-
ical problems is because of the unique difficulties associated with monitoring
the behavior of government lawyers. This is largely due to the fact that, un-
like lawyers in the private sector who have clearly defined clients with clearly
defined interests, lawyers in the public sector do not have clearly defined
clients with clear interests. Rather, those interests change dramatically with
changing political winds.
Finally, public-choice theory6 predicts that, even where the client of a
government lawyer can be clearly identified (perhaps in the case of an ad-
3 The term "captured" is drawn from "'capture theory,' a primitive version of the eco-
nomic theory of regulation which predicts 'that over time regulatory agencies come to be
dominated by the industries regulated.'" Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Leg-
islation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223,263
(1986) (quoting Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMr.
Sc. 335, 341 (1974)).
4 See infra part II.B.
5 See infra notes 19-50 and accompanying text.
6 Public-choice theory models the political process from an economic perspective. It
demonstrates that political outcomes generally reflect the preferences of narrowly focused, self-
aggrandizing interest groups. Thus, under the public-choice model, regulation does not serve the
interests of the public, but rather the interests of the entities being regulated. For a general
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ministrative agency), the objectives of the agency may drift from the original
purposes of the agency, as the agency struggles for influence and prominence
within the political arena.
Part I of this Article summarizes the principal-agent nature of the rela-
tionship between lawyers and clients and explains how the rules of ethics and
professional responsibility work together with market mechanisms to control
lawyer behavior within the private sector. Part II turns to private-sector law-
yers who represent clients before government agencies and demonstrates
how the client's interests can be subjugated to the long-term interest of the
lawyer or law firm in maintaining a cordial relationship with the particular
agency or to the interest of the lawyer or law firm in avoiding sanctions. In
Part III, we conclude by examining the ethical problems facing government
lawyers that are created by the lack of market controls, monitoring difficul-
ties, and bureaucratic drift.
I Lawyers and Clients as Agents and Principals
In a wide variety of contexts, principals hire agents to perform special-
ized tasks for them. When a shareholder purchases stock in a publicly traded
corporation, she is entering an agency relationship with the managers and
directors of that company. When a patient visits a doctor, she is entering a
principal-agent relationship. When someone hires a plumber to fix a leaky
faucet she enters into a principal-agent relationship. Likewise, the retention
of a lawyer by a client establishes a principal-agent relationship. One of the
central points of this Article is to establish that the core problems that exist
between lawyers and their clients are no different than the problems that
exist between shareholders and management, doctors and patients, or home-
owners and plumbers.
First, it is often extremely difficult to determine the quality of work be-
ing performed by the agent. And, when the work being done is complex and
therefore must be performed by teams, the problem of measuring perform-
ance quality becomes more difficult. Indeed with lawyers, doctors, and
plumbers it is even difficult to determine whether the work being performed
was necessary, or alternatively, whether projects that ought to be pursued are
in fact being pursued.
A second problem that is endemic to agency relationships is the problem
that arises when agents divert assets or business opportunities to themselves
at the expense of the principal. A doctor might perform an operation not
only to increase the cost of services unnecessarily, but also in order to experi-
ment with a new procedure, or to develop a reputation for expertise in a new
area of specialty. Similarly, problems that arise in the lawyer-client relation-
ship involve not only the delivery of unneeded services in order to pad the
client's bill, but also the delivery of unneeded services in order to try out a
new legal theory or to develop a reputation in a new area of legal specialty.
Thus, the situation in which a lawyer might take a case to trial when the client
would be better off if the case were settled is a good illustration of the way
description of public-choice theory, see Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice" The Theory of the
Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 43 (1988).
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that issues of legal ethics are best seen as what economists describe as
agency-cost problems.
Our point here is that the attorney-client relationship is an economic
relationship that is best categorized in the principal-agent context. The pur-
pose of the rules regarding professional responsibility and legal ethics7 that
govern lawyers is to lower the cost of the principal-agent relationship.
Market-Based Rules Governing Lawyers' Conduct. The Economics of
Reputation-Building
Lawyers and clients share a common problem. This problem arises from
the inability of clients to monitor lawyers effectively. Because of clients' in-
ability to monitor their lawyer-agents at the relevant margins, clients will be
less willing to hire lawyers than they would be in the absence of such moni-
toring problems. In other words, to the extent that people are concerned
about their lawyers stealing from them, or failing to represent them effec-
tively, or putting their own interests ahead of their clients' interests in more
subtle ways, lawyers, as individuals and as a group, have a strong incentive to
devise contractual devices that cause clients to trust them.
Apart from contractual devices, the primary market mechanism by
which lawyers seek to increase demand for their services is by causing clients
to trust them through "reputation-building." A lawyer's reputation is a valu-
able asset precisely because it will decline in value if the lawyer acts in ways
that are contrary to the interests of her client. A lawyer will not cheat a
client if the profit from cheating the client will be less than the loss in busi-
ness that comes as a result of the reputation damage that occurs when the
lawyer's cheating is discovered.
Thus, lawyers' reputations serve as a bonding mechanism because the
diminution in reputation that a lawyer suffers from poor performance is a
type of penalty that is forfeited in the same way that a traditional bond is
forfeited for nonperformance. In other words, basic economic theory implies
that lawyers will invest considerable resources in reputation-building in order
to increase the demand for their services.
Lawyers make investments in reputation capital by attending prestigious
law schools and by joining prestigious law firms. The costs of cheating to a
lawyer trained at Harvard or Yale will be higher than to a lawyer trained at
an unaccredited night law school simply because the lawyer trained in the Ivy
League has more to lose by cheating than the other lawyer.
Lawyers who associate themselves with prestigious law firms increase
the market demand for their services for a variety of reasons. One of the
most important of these reasons is that the lawyers who associate with law
firms of high reputation are in effect "renting" the reputation of those firms.
A particular lawyer may be unknown to a client, but the name of Davis Polk
& Wardwell or Sullivan & Cromwell speaks volumes. Associating with a
prestigious law firm is a particularly effective bonding mechanism for three
reasons.
7 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCr (1994); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
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First, because the value of a law firm's reputation is great, the firm has a
very strong incentive to use great care and selectivity in its hiring practices.
The costs to a law firm of having a partner or associate cheat a client might
be as great if not greater to the firm than to the client.
Second, and more importantly, the prestigious law firm is able to moni-
tor its young associates more effectively than smaller firms. Consequently,
clients will value greatly the willingness of law firms to monitor their partners
and associates. It is commonplace for small firm lawyers to complain about
larger rivals chronically overstaffing cases by routinely assigning what appear
to be a surfeit of partners and associates to handle cases. It is difficult to
explain this practice as a simple matter of lawyer overbilling, because the
practice is so easy for clients to detect, and because if large law firms truly
had sufficient market power to overbill they could just do it. A better expla-
nation may be that such "overstaffing" actually serves as an effective mecha-
nism by which large firms can protect their clients and their own reputations
by enabling their lawyers to monitor the work of their colleagues.
Third, unlike smaller law firms, many large law firms tend to receive a
disproportionate amount of business from a small number of large, institu-
tional clients, particularly banks or other financial institutions.8 The depen-
dency of these firms on a particular client results in a situation in which such
firms will suffer greatly if the client decides to take its business elsewhere.
The high proportion of large firms' total revenue that derives from a small
number of clients serves to constrain the behavior of such firms because of
the high cost of acting in ways that deviate from the interests of such clients.9
Of course, all of this monitoring and bonding is not costless.' 0 And for
some clients, the costs will not be worth the benefits. Much of this activity,
however, represents efficient market mechanisms for solving the monitoring
problem that exists between clients and lawyers.
I1 Repeat Players and Liability Avoidance: Lawyers and
Bureaucrats Versus Clients
The above description of the roles that the market and the rules of pro-
fessional responsibility play in controlling attorney behavior applies to law-
yers within the private sector. This Part examines two acute conflicts of
interest that arise with respect to private-sector lawyers who engage in the
practice of law before government agencies. We label the first conflict the
"repeat-player" problem and the second the "liability avoidance" problem.
8 Cf. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHIcAGo LAwYERs: THE SOCIAL STRUC-
TtuRE OF THE BAR (1982); Robert L. Nelson, Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Struc-
ture of Large Law Firms, 1981 AM. B. FouNmD. RES. J. 97.
9 Cf. Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, in FOUJNDA-
TIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 87, 90 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993). Professor Romano makes this
point in the context of the jurisdictional competition for corporate charters. She argues that
Delaware has credibly committed itself to being responsive to the needs of corporations because
such a high portion of the state's revenues come from its incorporation business. Id.
10 For a general discussion of monitoring and bonding in the context of agency relation-
ships, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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A. The Repeat-Player Problem
The interests of lawyers and clients can diverge where the lawyer/repeat
player wants to ingratiate and appease the agency bureaucrats. Whereas the
client may want the lawyer to vigorously assert its interests, even to the point
of claiming illegal activity by the agency, a law firm may be unwilling to zeal-
ously assert the client's interests if doing so would alienate the bureaucrats
and give the firm the reputation of being held in low esteem by the agency-
a result that would cause other clients who need representation before the
agency to turn to other law firms that are held in higher esteem by the
agency. Not only might this pattern of events cause other clients to refrain
from using the law firm's services in the future for fear of actual retaliation, it
might also cause clients simply to believe that another law firm might receive
a more sympathetic audience within the agency. This problem is particularly
acute where a law firm, or an individual lawyer, has devoted years to devel-
oping particularized expertise in the legal sub-specialty that constitutes the
administrative agency's jurisdiction, because alienating the agency could well
result in a substantial diminution in the value of that human capital
investment.
Monroe Freedman has previously analyzed this issue with his character-
istic brilliance and wisdom, in the particular context of the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC" or the "Commission")." Freedman notes
that lawyers who represent clients in the securities industry, along with law-
yers who represent "the poor, minorities, and the politically unpopular,
should be added to the roster of those who are in legal and professional jeop-
ardy."'1 2 Freedman blames this jeopardy on "serious abuses by the Securities
and Exchange Commission of the rights of those subject to its jurisdiction" as
well as on "the fact that the SEC has succeeded in intimidating the attorneys
who appear before it, with the result that zealous advocacy has been sharply
curtailed in securities matters.'
13
Professor Freedman agrees with prominent securities lawyers who ob-
serve that " '[t]he professional training of the New York securities bar is to
cave in' " and also that" '[t]he securities bar has abdicated its responsibilities
to its clients in deference to the Commission.' "14 We believe that Professor
Freedman is wrong, however, to blame the lack of forceful representation by
the securities bar solely on the misconduct of the SEC, although we have no
reason to doubt his analysis in this regard. Rather, even in the absence of
overt misconduct and intimidation, the problem of repeat dealing would still
exist.
11 See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETxcs i AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 21-22
(1975) [hereinafter FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETmIcs]; Monroe H. Freedman, A Civil Libertarian
Looks at Securities Regulation, 35 Omo ST. L.J. 280,285 (1974); Monroe H. Freedman, Profes-
sional Responsibility in Securities Regulation, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 24,1974, at 1, 4; see also Monroe H.
Freedman, Securities Enforcement: A Reply to Critics, N.Y. L.J., May 30, 1974, at 1 (responding
to criticism of his earlier analysis of SEC practices).
12 FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHIcs, supra note 11, at 20-21.
13 Id. at 21.
14 Id. (quoting two unnamed securities lawyers).
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Of course it might be said that the clients who are represented by securi-
ties lawyers before the SEC are highly sophisticated and able to fend for
themselves by selecting aggressive lawyers who will vigorously assert their
interests. Specifically, it might be argued that if there were a problem of
inadequate representation due to the problem of repeat dealings, then the
problem could easily be solved by having clients select law firms that were
not repeat players before agencies. The problem with this solution, of
course, is that it often results in higher costs for the clients, because the law-
yers in the new firm would have to familiarize themselves with the substan-
tive law falling under the agency's jurisdiction. And, of course, there could
be no guarantee that the neophyte law firm selected would not use the op-
portunity presented by the client to attempt to become a repeat player before
the agency.
A second problem with this analysis is that it is difficult for clients to
anticipate when hardball tactics will be necessary in dealing with an agency.
Consequently, it is difficult for clients to tell when conflicts will arise before it
is too late. A third and far more serious problem is that the law firms that
are repeat players before regulatory agencies are truly favored in the sense
that they are given preferential treatment by the bureaucrats in the agen-
cies.' 5 Clients, of course, are attracted to law firms whose lawyers qualify for
such preferential treatment and may be willing to risk the danger that subse-
quent events may develop that make it necessary to employ hardball tactics
with the agency. Thus, at one stage of a proceeding before an agency, a client
may benefit because his attorney receives "the opportunity, denied to others,
to appear before [an agency] at a critical stage" in the proceedings.16 At a
later stage in the proceedings, however, the lawyers may "trade off the rights
of some clients in order to curry favor with the [agency] and thereby advance
the rights of other clients."'1 7 Although we fully agree with Professor Freed-
man that it is unethical for the government to intimidate attorneys into fore-
going zealous advocacy on behalf of their clients,' 8 we believe that the
lawyers share at least some of the blame with the bureaucrats.
B. The Liability-Avoidance Problem
The preceeding Section argued that the repeat-player phenomenon cre-
ates a conflict that can cause private-sector lawyers who represent clients
before government lawyers and bureaucracies to subordinate the interests of
their clients to their own long-term interests in maintaining a close and cor-
dial relationship with the government lawyer or bureaucracy. Clients' inter-
ests in allying themselves with lawyers held in high esteem by administrative
agencies, coupled with lawyers' interests in maintaining their cozy relation-
ships with such agencies, result in a situation in which lawyers will be unwill-
ing to represent their clients' interests with zeal in certain situations.
15 See i. at 21-22.
16 Id. at 22.
17 Id.
18 See id. at 21-22.
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In this Section, we argue that the increasing sanctions faced by private-
sector lawyers when dealing with administrative agencies create a further
conflict that seriously threatens to exacerbate the problem of less-than-zeal-
ous representation of clients' interests by their lawyers. In recent years, gov-
ernment agencies in heavily regulated industries such as banking and
securities have moved to impose sanctions for ethical violations against law-
yers and law firms. Clearly, the possibility of such sanctions intensifies the
problem of less-than-zealous representation of clients before administrative
agencies.
The Kaye, Scholer matter presents a vivid example of this point. In
1992, the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler settled for $41
million a $275 million suit brought against it by the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion ("OTS") arising out of the firm's representation of Charles Keating's
Lincoln Savings & Loan Association ("Lincoln"). 19 In 1986, Lincoln had re-
tained Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue to represent it in its semiannual examina-
tion ("1986 Examination") before the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
("FHLBB").20 Lincoln, upset with Jones, Day's nonconfrontational ap-
proach, replaced that firm with Kaye, Scholer.21 Kaye, Scholer had repre-
sented Charles Keating's American Continental Corporation ("ACC") since
1977, and had also represented Lincoln on other matters since the thrift's
acquisition by ACC in early 1984.2
Kaye, Scholer took a confrontational approach to FHLBB requests dur-
ing the 1986 Examination. As one examiner described the relationship,
"'This was not a dialogue. This was a stiff-arm day in and day out.' "23 The
1986 Examination resulted in a negative report of examination ("1986
ROE"), and a confidential recommendation by the examiners to appoint a
receiver for Lincoln. Kaye, Scholer answered with a strong rebuttal describ-
ing Lincoln's sound management and financial stability and threatened litiga-
tion if the FHLBB pursued receivership. These threats, coupled with
pressure from a group of U.S. senators, worked: the FHLBB decided not to
pursue the matter.24
Lincoln continued to retain Kaye, Scholer for the thrift's next FHLBB
examination in July of 1988. Once again, Lincoln received a very negative
report of examination, and once again, Kaye, Scholer answered with a strong
rebuttal. Three months after Kaye, Scholer's response, in March of 1989, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Company ("FDIC") (the predecessor to the OTS)
seized Lincoln, which was insolvent by more than $2.6 billionZ5
19 In the Matter of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler: A Symposium on Govern-
ment Regulation, Lawyers' Ethics, and the Rule of Law, 66 S. CAt. L. REv. 977, 977-78 (1993)
[hereinafter Symposium].
20 Id. at 979.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Susan Beck & Michael Orey, They Got What They Deserved, AM. LAW., May 1992, at
68, 70 (quoting an unnamed Federal Home Loan Bank staff attorney).
24 Symposium, supra note 19, at 980.
25 Id.
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The seizure of Lincoln meant that the OTS could reach internal docu-
ments and waive the attorney-client privilege to use those documents against
Kaye, Scholer. 26 After an investigation that lasted over a year and a half, the
OTS filed ten charges for $275 million in damages against the firm in March
of 1992.27 Asserting that the charges established a prima facie showing that
Kaye, Scholer had a "proclivity to violate laws and regulations, breach their
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care and engage in unsafe and unsound prac-
tices," the OTS issued a temporary cease-and-desist order, freezing the firm's
assets.28
Claiming that it had acted in accordance with its duties as litigation
counsel for Lincoln, Kaye, Scholer protested its innocence in a memorandum
released that same day.29 In addition, Kaye, Scholer released a summary of
the opinion of legal ethics expert Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.30 The
opinion, which had been drafted by the firm's attorneys, but was signed by
Professor Hazard,31 concluded that:
Kaye, Scholer did not violate existing standards of ethical conduct
and professional responsibility, and Kaye, Scholer acted in accord
with its duties under the law. The disclosures and representations
that the OTS alleges should have been made to the [FHLBB] by
Kaye, Scholer in fact would have violated the standards of ethical
conduct and professional responsibility generally recognized as ap-
plicable to Kaye, Scholer in its role as litigation counsel.
32
Nevertheless, Kaye, Scholer settled with the OTS for $41 million less than a
week later.3
3
As Professor Dennis Curtis has noted, "warring views of the lawyer's
role" were at the core of the dispute between the OTS and Kaye, Scholer,
"with the regulators and the lawyers espousing radically different models.
'34
The OTS offered a vision based on the notion that lawyers practicing before
regulatory agencies should practice the "whole law."'35 By contrast, Kaye,
26 Id.
27 Id.; In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19 (Mar. 1, 1992) (notice of charges against Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler and three partners), reprinted in STEPHEN GLmLERs & Roy
D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDs 734 (1993).
28 In re Fishbein, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 89,040, at
81,258-59 (Office of Thrift Supervision Mar. 1, 1992) (temporary order to cease and desist).
29 See Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye Scholer, the Office of
Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 985, 989 (1993).
30 See Summary of the Expert Opinion of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., reprinted in THE AT-
TORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFTER KAYE, SCHOLER (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 779, 1992).
31 See id. at 402.
32 Id. at 398-99.
33 OTS, Kaye Scholer Agree to Settle; Firm Will Pay $41 Million Restitution, 58 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 472 (Mar. 16, 1992). In addition to the Kaye, Scholer settlement, the law
firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue agreed to pay the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC")
$51 million to settle claims the RTC had brought against the firm for its role in the Lincoln
failure. James S. Granelli, Law Firm to Pay $51 Million in Keating Case, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20,
1993, at D1.
34 Curtis, supra note 29, at 989.
35 Thomas C. Rice & Blake A. Bell, Liability of Lender's Counsel, in LENDER LABILrrY
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Scholer took the view that the ethical duties of lawyers are grounded in their
duty to be a zealous advocate of their client's interests. Although Kaye,
Scholer's exact reasons for such a quick and costly capitulation can only be
speculated upon, it is clear that the case will dramatically effect the way law-
yers practice before government agencies.
Moreover, the OTS's vision of the lawyer's role in representing financial
institutions before regulatory agencies is insupportable in many respects.
The essence of the OTS's view is that "thrift lawyers should practice the
'whole law' by counseling their clients not to exploit technical 'loopholes'
that 'disregard the significance of principles of general applicability.' "36
Such a standard goes beyond what the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct require of lawyers. 37 The
OTS's view has two critical weaknesses. First, as Lawrence Fox notes, by
requiring the lawyer to enforce the whole law, the OTS would transform the
lawyer
into an enforcer for the government. In effect then, the client pays
for the lawyer to represent the regulatory agency. This effects a sit-
uation whereby the client was denied its right to counsel, for if the
lawyer owes a duty to the regulator, a crucial question must be
asked: "Who fulfills the role of the lawyer for the client?"
38
Second, as Professor David Wilkins notes, the OTS's vision does not
"explain how firms like Kaye, Scholer should divine the content of these gen-
eral principles in the midst of the kind of pervasive political conflict over
regulatory policy that existed during the period that Kaye, Scholer repre-
sented Lincoln." 39 Thus, in situations where the policies and objectives of the
agency are at best ambiguous and at worst in conflict, Wilkins concludes that
the OTS's view "actually boils down to a requirement that S&L lawyers
counsel their clients to comply with the regulators' (or perhaps even the pri-
mary regulators') current articulated interpretation of the governing rules
and regulations."40
Like the OTS, the Securities and Exchange Commission is also seeking
to police ethical violations by private-sector lawyers who practice before the
AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION INVOLVINO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 273, 277, 280 (ALI-
ABA Course of Study Materials No. C665, 1991) (discussing speech by OTS Chief Counsel Har-
ris Weinstein).
36 David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1145, 1167 (1993) (quoting Harris Weinstein, Issues of Professional Responsibility
Arising from the Savings and Loan Failures, Remarks at the University of Michigan Law School
8-9 (Mar. 24, 1992)).
37 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 2.1 (1994) (stating that lawyers
"shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice"); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY EC 7-3 (1980) ("While serving as advocate, a lawyer should re-
solve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the law. In serving... as adviser, a lawyer
in appropriate circumstances should give his professional opinion as to what the ultimate deci-
sions of the courts would likely be as to the applicable law.").
38 Lawrence J. Fox, OTS vs. Kaye, Scholer: An Assault on the Citadel, 48 Bus. LAW. 1521,
1524 (1993).
39 Wilkins, supra note 36, at 1168.
40 Id. at 1169.
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Commission. On December 3, 1992, the SEC released an order arising out of
Salomon Brothers's violations of United States Treasury auctions. 41 Salo-
mon's government securities traders had submitted false and/or fraudulent
bids in numerous auctions of government securities.42 Within the period of
this activity, knowledge of such an occurrence came to senior management's
attention. 43 Donald Feuerstein, Salomon's general counsel, advised manage-
ment that the bid was likely a criminal act and of the need to report the
occurrence to the appropriate regulatory officials.44 Despite telling Mr.
Feuerstein that they would follow his advice, the senior management at the
firm failed to report the bid.45 Months later, after additional bidding viola-
tions had occurred, disclosure was finally made.46
Although the SEC took no formal action against Salomon's former chief
legal officer, Donald Feuerstein, the SEC's order did set forth the Commis-
sion's "views on the supervisory responsibilities of legal and compliance of-
ficers." 47 The SEC listed three alternatives for future lawyers placed in Mr.
Feuerstein's position, that is where counsel is aware, or should be aware, that
the client is not implementing their advice: (1) go to the board of directors;
(2) resign; or, (3) disclose the wrongdoing to the appropriate regulatory
authority.48
Actions like those taken by the OTS and the SEC demonstrate that ad-
ministrative agencies, at least in heavily regulated industries such as banking
and securities, have begun to take over enforcement of the ethical rules from
the bar. Government agencies embrace this because it gives them access to
the "deep pockets" of big law firms. 49 Faced with a new source of liability
exposure that has a potential to inflict massive damage upon the firm, law
firms are likely to refrain from zealously advocating the interests of their
clients. Indeed, corporate lawyers who practice before such regulatory au-




The problem of regulating lawyers' ethical conduct in the public sector is
much more difficult than the problem of regulating lawyers' ethical conduct
in the private sector for three reasons. First, public-sector lawyers are not
constrained by the same market forces that work to control the actions of
private-sector lawyers. This lack of market control, coupled with government
41 See In re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31554, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,067 (Dec. 3, 1992).
42 C. Evan Stewart, Corporate Counsel as Whistleblower, N.Y. L.J., July 1, 1993, at 5.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 5-6; Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 83,599.
45 Stewart, supra note 42, at 6.
46 Id.
47 Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 83,608.
48 Stewart, supra note 42, at 6.
49 See Curtis, supra note 29, at 987.
50 See generally, James R. Doty, Regulatory Expectations Regarding the Conduct of Attor-
neys in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws: Recent Development and Lessons for the
Future, 48 Bus. LAw. 1543 (1993); Fox, supra note 38.
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attorneys' proclivity to litigate and engage in career-building, creates the risk
that government lawyers will pursue their own interests, interests that are
often adverse to the agency that they represent.
A second source of problems arises from the difficulty of monitoring
public-sector lawyers. These monitoring problems arise largely because the
public-sector lawyers do not have the same clearly defined clients with clear
interests. The lack of monitoring results in the potential for the interests of
public-sector lawyers to change with the political winds.
Finally, public-choice theory5' predicts that, even where a government
lawyer can identify her client, bureaucratic drift will cause the administrative
agency's objectives to shift from the original purposes of the agency.52 This
shift occurs as the agency struggles for influence and prominence within the
political arena.53
A. Problems Created by a Lack of Market Forces
In the private sector, rules of ethics and professional responsibility work
in combination with market controls to ensure that a lawyer does not place
her own interests ahead of her client's. The absence of market control in the
public sector allows government lawyers to engage in excessive litigation and
career-building.
First, we need to identify whose interests it is that the government law-
yer should be advocating. We point out that the scope of a government attor-
ney's ethical duties must be understood in the context of the attorney's role
in a system of separation of powers. It is not the responsibility of an agency
attorney to represent the "public interest" nor the government as a whole.
Rather, the constitutional system of checks and balances depends upon the
institutional loyalty of its attorneys. Although this argument runs counter to
the common intuition that the government attorney should act to further the
common good, we argue that this common view is ultimately insupportable,
in large part because there is simply no consensus in our pluralistic society as
to what constitutes the common good. Thus, the argument that government
lawyers have a broad ethical duty to further the public interest that tran-
scends their narrow duties to their agencies would lead to government attor-
neys being free to operate without any constraints on their behavior.
Congress, the federal courts, and other agencies can and should protect
their own interests. To the extent that government attorneys clash with other
government attorneys in other branches of government, or in other agencies,
this conflict is a normal and healthy manifestation of the operation of the
separation of powers. To the extent that government attorneys clash within
the agency itself, however, there is a potential for the government attorney to
advance his own interests at the expense of the agency as a whole.
For example, suppose that a supervisor approaches a lawyer within an
administrative agency with a project that the lawyer knows is in contradiction
with the goals and policies of the agency. What advice should the govern-
51 See supra note 6.
52 See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
53 See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
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ment attorney provide? Obviously, the government lawyer should advise the
supervisor against the project. The problem is that there is no market control
on the government attorney in this situation and, therefore, nothing which
prevents the government lawyer from supporting a project that contradicts
the goals and policies of the agency.
Now consider the analogous situation in the context of a corporation.
Suppose a corporate manager approaches corporate counsel for advice on a
project that the lawyer knows will benefit managemenit at the expense of the
shareholders. What should the lawyer do? Again, the lawyer should advise
against the project. Unlike the public sector context, however, a variety of
market mechanisms exist in the private sector context that help to produce
the correct advice. The market for corporate control, managerial labor mar-
kets, capital markets, and products markets all provide incentives for the cor-
poration to engage in projects that benefit shareholders, and reject those that
hurt shareholders. Thus, these market mechanisms provide a strong incen-
tive for the lawyer to advise against the project; the result is that, at least in
the private sector, good legal advice is often consistent with good ethical
advice.
One risk created by the absence of market constraints is excess litiga-
tion. Government lawyers may have strong incentives to litigate rather than
settle cases. Hughes Aircraft's recent $114 million patent infringement judg-
ment against NASA provides a telling example.5 4 That case has been in liti-
gation for twenty-eight years.55 Why so long? Victor Savikas, of Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue and counsel to Hughes Aircraft since 1979, says that the
biggest part of the problem is that" '[a]ttorneys for the government feel they
have to protect the public treasury, so they never concede anything. There-
fore, you have to litigate every issue.'"56 Another disincentive to settle
comes from the fact that any settlement agreed to prior to the filing of the
lawsuit is paid out of the budget of the agency involved, whereas litigated
judgments are paid out of the general revenue.57 Additionally, young law-
yers often join government agencies in order to gain work experience, which
may lead to government lawyers having strong incentives to litigate rather
than settle cases.
A second risk is that government attorneys will engage in career-build-
ing. Agency attorneys who plan to go into private practice have strong incen-
tives to "sell out" their agencies in order to curry favor with private-sector
attorneys. Just as private-sector law firms have the potential to be "cap-
tured" by an agency that they wish to develop a long-term relationship with,
government lawyers have the risk of being "captured" by the private law
firms they later hope to practice with.58 We do not mean to suggest that
government lawyers will be "bad lawyers," rather we suggest that govern-
ment lawyers have incentives to act favorably towards interest groups repre-
54 See Bruce Rubenstein, $114 Million Not Enough: Hughes Aircraft Appeals Latest Judg-
ment in 28-Year-Long Saga, Cop. LEGAL Tnvms, Oct. 1994, at 1.
55 See id. at 31.
56 Id at 31, 34 (quoting Victor Savikas of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue).
57 Id. at 34.
58 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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sented by private-sector firms with which the government attorney hopes to
practice. Thus, in trying to establish themselves as "good lawyers," govern-
ment lawyers may end up advocating the cause of the regulated.
B. Problems Created by a Lack of Monitoring
In the private sector, a lawyer's interests are generally provided by the
client. The client can be expected to understand what his interests are, and to
monitor the behavior of the lawyer to ensure that the lawyer continues to
represent the interests of the client. The private-sector lawyer knows that if
she strays too far from the client's interests she risks losing the client, or
worse, a malpractice suit.
Public-sector lawyers, by contrast, often do not have the benefit of a
clearly defined client. This lack of monitoring constraint creates the potential
for the interests of government lawyers to change with the political winds.
The Justice Department's recent switch in the case of Taxman v. Board
of Education59 illustrates exactly this kind of shift. The case involves a white
teacher, Sharon Taxman, and a black teacher, Debra Williams, who were
hired on the same day in 1980 to teach in the business education department
at Piscataway High School.60 In 1989, budget cuts forced the school board to
eliminate one of the positions.61 The board's policy in the situation where
two teachers have equal seniority was to draw lots.62 Instead of following this
procedure, the school board chose to fire Taxnan on the basis of the district's
affirmative action policy, as Ms. Williams was the only black teacher in Pis-
cataway High School's business education department.
63
The Justice Department under the Bush Administration brought a Title
VII claim against the Piscataway school board on behalf of Ms. Taxman, who
was later added as a plaintiff.64 After the United States and Ms. Taxman
prevailed at the district court level, the Piscataway school board appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The current assis-
tant attorney general for civil rights, Deval Patrick, decided to switch sides in
the suit.65 The United States withdrew as a plaintiff and recently filed an
amicus brief on behalf of the school board.66 The Justice Department's
switch raises significant ethical concerns about confidentiality and attorney-
client privilege, in the light of the fact that the Department's lawyers worked
closely in the original trial with Ms. Taxman's lawyer. Thus, the case illus-
trates the kinds of ethical problems that administrative agencies are prone to
because of monitoring problems and suggests the need for ethical guidelines
to help control lawyer behavior in this area.
59 832 F. Supp. 836 (D.N.J. 1993).
60 Id. at 839-40.
61 See it. at 840.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See id. at 837.
65 U.S. Agency Switches Sides in Case Over Civil Rights, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at B10.
66 Id.
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C. Bureaucratic Drift and Turf-Building
In addition to ethical problems created by the lack of market controls
and monitoring difficulties, government attorneys also face unique ethical
problems due to the general tendencies of turf-building and bureaucratic
drift67 within administrative agencies. Because of their expertise in the legal
system, government lawyers are particularly adroit at engaging in these activ-
ities. The result is that government attorneys will seek to expand their power
within an agency at the expense of the agency, or to expand the power of the
agency at the expense of society.
As Anthony Downs has observed, there exists in all bureaucracies a ten-
dency to substitute private, self-interested objectives for the public objectives
that provided the impetus for their origination.68 This substitution occurs be-
cause the people who comprise the workforce of an agency have made highly
specific investments of human capital in the agency. Consequently, agency
employees develop a vested interest in maintaining and expanding the
agency's role in the government structure.69 Similarly, government attorneys
have strong incentives to seek legal solutions to problems in order to expand
the relative importance of attorneys within the agency and of the agency as a
whole.
Public-choice theory, meanwhile, has demonstrated that the objectives
of administrative agencies tend to drift away from the original objectives of
the agency as the agency fights for influence and prominence within the polit-
ical arena.70 This "bureaucratic drift" results in "changes in administrative
agency policies that lead to outcomes inconsistent with the original expecta-
tions of the legislation's intended beneficiaries."'71 Thus, even where the gov-
ernment lawyers' clients can be clearly identified as the legislation's intended
beneficiaries, bureaucratic drift will cause the agency's interests to shift away
from the interests of those beneficiaries.
A recent attempted settlement by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") with the California Public Utilities Commission
("PUC") illustrates this point. In that case, a group of PUC employees were
represented by the EEOC in an age discrimination suit.72 The EEOC's at-
67 See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
68 ANTHoNY DowNs, INSME BUREAUCRACY 82 (1967).
69 See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Forma-
tion: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 909, 919 (1994).
70 Cf. Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on "Administrative Arrange-
ments and the Political Control ofAgencies" Administrative Process and Organizational Form as
Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REv. 499, 500-01 (1989) (concluding that
elected politicians utilize "intelligent foresight" when creating agencies by devising initial enact-
ments that will protect against the influence of bureaucrats and subsequent political coalitions);
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Ar-
rangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. Rv. 431, 432 (1989) (stating that
legislatively imposed procedural constraints play a critical role in controlling bureaucratic
agents).
71 Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War
Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEo. L.J. 671, 672 (1991).
72 EEOC v. California, No. C 90-0378, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9642, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June
20, 1993).
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tempted settlement with PUC was rejected by U.S. District Court Judge Bar-
bara Caulfield. 73 Judge Caulfield's rejection cited objections by class
members who maintained that the government attorneys were selling them
out. Lawyers at the EEOC, who attempted settlement because they believed
that the employee's case was "weak," had made institutional reform their
primary interest in the case, despite demands from the class that any settle-
ment include a payout to class members. The EEOC's belief that the em-
ployees' case was weak conflicted with a jury verdict in Judge Caulfield's
court of $323,958 against the PUC brought by two PUC employees who had
sued the PUC without the EEOC.74
Conclusion
This Article has examined the topic of government lawyers and profes-
sional responsibility from a law and economics perspective. We identify a
new potential ethical dilemma for lawyers who represent private-sector cli-
ents in their dealings with government bureaucracies. As we observe, such
lawyers have strong incentives to refrain from vigorously asserting their cli-
ents' interests where their clients' interests are threatening to the interests of
the agency, or where such zealousness would risk exposure to sanctions. In
such cases, lawyers may try to preserve their relationship with the agency, or
protect themselves from sanctions, at the expense of their clients.
In addition, we have argued that the absence of market discipline over
government attorneys makes the possibility of ethical violations particularly
acute for government lawyers. Such lawyers are more likely than private-
sector attorneys to put their own interests ahead of the interests of their
agency because of the absence of market constraints on their behavior. Mon-
itoring problems also create ethical problems for government lawyers. The
problems result from the fact that the interests that the lawyer is supposed to
represent often are not clearly defined, and can change with the political
winds. Finally, even in those instances in which the government attorney
may be able to identify his client, bureaucratic drift will pull the objectives of
the agency away from the original purposes of the agency.
73 Id. at *2.
74 Steven G. Hirsch, Equal Opportunity Litigation: The EEOC Can't Settle an Age Bias
Case Against the PUC Because Some of the Affected Workers Think the Agency Is Taking too Soft
a Line. A Recent Jury Verdict Isn't Making the Government's Position Any More Tenable, THE
RECORDER, Apr. 2, 1993, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Recrdr File.
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